A quarrel over how much of a nation's screen time one company holds has crossed a line: in a statement released today — made public on November 2, according to Chinese business media — commentator Qin Shuo said he had commissioned lawyers to file a case with the People's Court over remarks he described as infringing his reputation, published by "Li Liang of Douyin Group". The underlying dispute, over whether China's internet really contains a "ByteDance time", is genuinely useful to readers who never touch app-industry data — but not as a scoreboard. The transferable skill is a method for stress-testing any claim that opens with a percentage of time and closes with a verdict about a whole industry. Below: what was actually said, what the numbers measure and what they do not, a six-question audit checklist, the traps that turn a statistic into a slogan, and the practical steps if an argument escalates into litigation.
Both sides quote the same report and reach opposite conclusions because they are answering different questions. Reading them in one table is the fastest way to see where the disagreement actually lives.
| Point at issue | Qin Shuo's reading | Li Liang's reading |
|---|---|---|
| Source of the number | Nomura Securities, citing QuestMobile data | The same Nomura report explicitly labels itself a "tracking-based estimate" |
| Universe measured | The Top 50 apps for time spent, August 2026; Qin notes the report's opening line says China's Top 50 apps hold 93% of mobile internet time | Only the Top 50 of a field with vastly more apps: no long-tail apps, no PC hours, and no always-on office and messaging windows at work |
| ByteDance share | 41.8% of that pool — a share in the 40% range, i.e. more than 40% of total user time | Not even one-half, so the framing does not survive its own legal analogy |
| Tencent share | 28.6%; the gap is 13.2 percentage points | Count equity stakes and invested companies and the Tencent group leads by total time |
| Legal yardstick | Article 24 of the Anti-Monopoly Law presumes dominance at one-half of a relevant market; with 40%-plus on the time axis, ByteDance has real dominance there | Short video and short drama are fully contested sectors; only instant messaging holds a stable position, because of the relationship-chain moat |
| Single-app facts | Hongguo is already the fourth-largest app in China by total usage time, behind Douyin, WeChat and Douyin Lite; its per-user daily time hit 125 minutes this past February | The most recent Nomura report (for September) shows WeChat back on top of China's most-used app list with a 19.3% share of time |
| Bottom line | "But the ByteDance time of China's internet has surpassed Tencent time — that is a fact, not an exaggeration at all" | No company can be called the "xx time of China's internet"; market flags change on the city wall constantly |
Qin's own analogy is worth keeping in view: scholars and media at home and abroad speak of the 21st century as China's century even though China's GDP is roughly 17% to 18% of the world's, and when Henry Luce proposed "the twentieth century was the American century" back in 1941, the United States economy was a little over 30% of the global total. Trend names are arguments, not measurements.
Why is Hongguo so red? Qin's summary: it has become an emotion-dispensing machine and a time-absorbing machine, driven jointly by free content, algorithmic recommendation, advertising monetisation and a platform ecosystem. Under that pressure Tencent launched Green Bubble short drama inside WeChat mini programs, "green" against "red", but Qin is not optimistic: Hongguo, like much of ByteDance's product line, is a highly algorithm-driven distribution machine, and ByteDance's inborn trait is using algorithms to grip human nature with a mastery he calls "the very peak".
His moral point is the 125 minutes themselves. That is a good number for ByteDance, he argues, but nothing to celebrate for users or society: the opportunity cost is less time in nature, less reading, less thinking, less time with relatives. The "high" is expensive, and the effects last. His remedy is not a ban but a demand that ByteDance use its content flow for more social value to repay the social cost it occupies, noting Toutiao and Douyin have already made some effort with some results.
Li's counter is commercial, not moral: users increasingly like Hongguo because content quality keeps rising; Tencent the company is growing its short-drama and short-video businesses far faster than Douyin, its Hongguo and the Douyin apps; and time is spread thickly across messaging, gaming, commerce and music. He also rejected the attribution implied by his own phrase: "This scholar proposes a so-called 'xx time of China's internet' — grossly exaggerated, not rigorous, not consistent with the facts, and it will not stand the test of time; it is not, in truth, the style of the man himself."
Li's core technical objection is the most reusable one in the whole exchange: "I suspect the Nomura data was handed to Mr Qin by someone else, and he never really read it. Nomura measured the distribution of time inside the Top 50 apps, calculated as: the sum of monthly usage time of a group's apps that appear in the Top 50, divided by the total monthly usage time of all Top 50 apps. It does not count long-tail apps, and it does not include PC internet time — many people have to stay connected at work, and messaging and office software are left open all day." Put plainly: in his words, "this is not China's internet time at all, it is the time of the mobile Top 50", and the report itself flags the numbers as a "tracking-based estimate".
Group totals depend on whether a stake counts as membership. Any share figure that can move several points by a labelling decision should be treated as a contested estimate, not a measurement.
Even the claim's author concedes it is not: ByteDance's 40%-plus share of user time does not equal 40% of user value. Alipay, Meituan, JD and Pinduoduo are service and transaction tools — used and left — so they can never match Douyin or Hongguo on the clock, which says nothing about what they create for users and society.
A metric that flips within weeks is a poor foundation for a permanent label. Qin's own list of competing clocks — ByteDance time, Tencent time, Taotian time, Pinduoduo time, Xiaohongshu time, Meituan time — is closer to what the data shows.
Article 24's one-half presumption is a rule about a defined relevant market, not a scoreboard of minutes. Comparing 41.8% with one-half is a legitimate check; concluding dominance from it is a legal argument, not a statistic. Qin's phrasing was that with a 40%-plus share on the time axis, "ByteDance time" is a very real fact, not something invented out of thin air — while admitting WeChat holds a dominant position on the social axis.
The same numbers underwrite a policy warning, a competitor's marketing brief and an investor's deck. Naming the intended audience is the fastest way to judge the claim. Li's own parting shot was a warning against reaching for a "grand characterisation": read the report first, then decide whether a single ranking matters enough to build a thesis on it.
Readers should understand the machinery, because it now sits at the end of many public online disputes in China.
Three verified data points put the fight in proportion.
Both answers are defensible because the phrase has no units. If it means "ByteDance apps are the largest single block of measured mobile app time in the Top 50", the 41.8% figure supports it. If it means "ByteDance defines Chinese internet time", the missing long tail, the missing PC hours and the September reversal to WeChat's 19.3% defeat it.
Because the vocabulary migrated from data to character. Words such as "absolute nonsense!" and "either stupidity or bad faith" are about the person, not the number, and Qin's filing argues that remarks published by "Li Liang of Douyin Group" harmed his reputation.
Not automatically. Article 24's one-half presumption needs a defined relevant market; time shares across 50 apps in a mobile panel are not that market definition.
Use your own denominator. Check the device's own screen-time report, then ask which specific activities, if any, those minutes replaced. The research says displacement is possible, not inevitable.
Audiences are sold by attention, budgets are earned by transactions, and the two are measured by different panels. Never compare a share-of-time number from one source with a share-of-time number from another without checking the inclusion rules.
Nobody needs to settle whether China's internet runs on ByteDance time to get value out of this episode. Settle something smaller and far more useful: whether you know the denominator of the next attention statistic you quote. The lawsuit will eventually produce a ruling; the six-question audit works the same day, on any chart, and costs nothing but a paragraph of footnotes.
Written by James Hartley, content editor at IT Insights (ItInsightsWorld). This guide is general information, not legal advice; for a reputation dispute, consult a qualified lawyer. Questions or corrections: contact@itinsights.com.